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The Navy expends more than 7.5 billion dollars annually to
operate and maintain its ships, aircraft and shore facilities. This
expenditure represents the resource cost of military and civilian
personnel, fuel, aircraft and ship overhaul, travel, training, utilities,
and hundreds of other items required annually to "operate" the davy.
Operating costs do not include the cost of procuring new ships, planes,
missiles, facilities or research and development work. The managerial
problems asso2iated with the planning, allocating, accounting, and
reporting of these costs are many and complex. One major cause of this
complexity stems from the fact that the Navy simultaneously manages
these costs in three dimensions—a budget dimension, a Department of
Defense program dimension, and an organizational dimension.
The administrative budget dimension groups operating costs
into appropriation categories and budget projects which represent
either functional groupings of cost, such as medical care or ship
overhaul, or resource groupings of cost, such as military personnel.
In either case, the Navy is the accounting and decision-making entity
in this dimension. The administrative budget is the primary financial
planning and control instrument and as such forms the base for the
Navy's accounting system. At the present time, Navy financial
management is oriented toward the budget "view", that is, the annual
budget format clearly covorns many aspects of financial management at
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Budget
Digest
.







The second dimension of management reflects the Department of
Defense programming system. Here, operating costs are grouped by
program elements, that is, an integrated combination of manpower,
equipment and facilities which in aggregate represent a certain military
capability. These program elements represent measurable military
outputs and are the decision-making and accounting entities for the
Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense programming system is
designed to:
...integrate the planning and programming and the financial
management functions in order to provide better tools for
decision-making by the Secretary of Defense and his military
advisors; and to create a planning and programming/financial
management system that is keyed to continous program decision-
making and not just geared to the annual budget cycle. In such
a system, not only would budget decisions be program decisions,
as they inevitably are now, but program decisions would be
budget decisions. That is, decisions to embark on programs would
be explicitly decisions to provide the resources required to
carry them out.2
The programming system provides the Secretary of Defense with the
means to perform the tasks assigned to him by the National Security
Act, specifically, the direction, authority and control over the
3Department of Defense.
The third dimension of management is in terms of Navy organization
entities. This dimension associates operating costs with specific
organizational units such as ships, aircraft squadrons, and shore
activities. Management takes two forms in this dimension t (1) Dollar
department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program
Change Control System . NAVKXOS P-2416, (August, 1962), p. 1-1.
^Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley:




management; and (2) Resource management. Briefly, dollar management
oan be thought of as a sub-system of the budget dimension. That is,
budget dollars are allotted to organizational entities for certain
operating expenses in terms of budget project categories. Resource
management is performed centrally by bureaus, that is, bureaus receive
and manage the funds to procure resources which they in turn allocate
to organizational units. An example of this form is personnel
management. Military personnel are centrally managed by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. The use of military personnel is controlled by
allocating individuals to organizational units. Within the framework
of these two general forms of management, the Navy has many sub-
management systems or management programs which are designed to manage
specific resources or functions such as facilities maintenance and
ship overhaul programs. These programs represent a managerial network
of financial and resource control over operating costs. The unit of
organization receiving or consumming resources is the usual accounting
and decision-making entity in this dimension of financial management.
The existence of these three dimensions in the Navy's financial
management system creates a managerial dilemma. Financial planning,
accounting, reporting and evaluation are performed separately—yet
jointly. That is, each dimension should be "interlocked" with the
others to maintain continuity and consistency of planning and operations.
The administrative burden associated with these three "views" of the
sane operating dollar is overwhelming—and perhaps unnecessary. One
must ask why these systems cannot be integrated to simplify management.
This thesis suggests that one step toward simplification could be
•
achieved by the development of an integrated accounting and reporting
system.
The Navy presently has over one hundred different data systems
"feeding" management information to the offices and bureaus in
Washington. These systems do not individually accumulate data which
is useful to all levels of management. For example, financial data
accumulated by the Navy accounting system has to be converted by means
of the Navy Cost Information System to be "useful" to the Secretary
of Defense. That is, the Navy Cost Information System attempts to
translate financial data from the budget dimension into the program
element dimension. In a similar manner, the Navy accounting system
does not directly provide all financial data for the functional and
resource management systems in use. As a result, management is often
performed with "bits" and "pieces" of data taken from or translated
from several different data systems.
This thesis i3 directed toward an examination of the three
dimensions of financial management described above. The purpose
of this examination is to identify fundamental differences which
impede the development of an integrated financial accounting and
reporting system. Particular emphasis is placed on the problems
which these three dimensions create in accounting and reporting Navy
See the Department of the Navy, Office of Management Information
Instruction 5230.1, Inventory of Automated Management Information
and Data Systems Used Within the Navy Department and Headquarters.
U.S. Marine Corps (October, 1965) for a listing of various data systems.
.
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operating costs in the different views.
An overview of the three dimensions of financial management
is presented in Part I. The different purposes of financial
management and the different entities which form the basis for
management decisions are examined in an attempt to interrelate the
three dimensions as well as to identify their differences. Part II
examines the different uses, definitions and basis for measuring
operating costs in the three dimensions. Part III examines the
Navy accounting and Cost Information System. The primary role of
the Navy accounting system is seen as one which supports fiscal
control and appropriation reporting for the administrative budget.
As a secondary role it supports the needs of management accounting.
The Navy Cost Information System is seen as a "statistical bridge"
which attempts to link budget information to program elements.
Most of the data for this study was obtained from a search of
military documents and publications. Some "interpretations" presented
differ from "published" practices and procedures. These represent the
author's interpretation of "actual practice" based on thirteen years
of observation and participation as a Naval Officer. In most cases,
these interpretations have been supported by others during recent
interviews held with military and civilian personnel assigned to
various bureaus and offices in the Washington area.
-"The Marine Corps is an integral part of the Naval Establishment
but it has been excluded from this study. References to Navy organiza-
tion, program elements, and financial structure intentionally exclude






THREE DIMENSIONS OF NAVY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER I
DEPARTS* :2IT Of DEFENCE PROGRAMING .SYSTEM
Planning
A clear distinction between planning and pro-cramming does not
exist because they are aspects of the same process. They differ,
essentially, in emphasis. Planning is the selection of military
actions or capabilities from available or conceived alternatives to
accomplish missions which are designed to counter military threats,
to achieve a given "posture of defense", or to provide a foundation
from ,vhich a military capability can be expanded. Programming is
the more specific translation of these actions or capabilities into
manpower, material, and facilities in both quantitative and dollar
terms. *
World tensions, national economic conditions, allied defenses,
specific military threats, developments of new weapon- systems, and
the size of potential enemy forces are but a few of the many factors
considered in the defense planning process. These are not finite and
measurable planning factors. Therefore, the President and the Congress,
with the advice of military and civilian advisors, ultimately sets
dollar limitations on defense planning. Annually these limitations
are stated in terms 01 funds allocated for defense. For the purpose
3-David Novick, Program Budgeting In the Department of Defense ,
RM 4210-RC (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., September, 1964.), p. 12.
;i
.-:... . ..-;. ..-:
6of this study, the decision making process for selecting specific
types of defense activities or capabilities to achieve the desired
missions within the probable framework of financial limitation is
considered planning.
Effective planning requires c. full understanding of the long
term implications of decisions to use one type of force structure as
against another. The implications must be understood in terms of
manpower limitations as well 83 other resource li<nitations. A
decision to develop a particular weapon-system carries with it an
obligation to acquire personnel, training, facilities, equipment, and
supporting requirements for the remainder of its useful life. Resources,
individually and collectively, are in limited supply. Thus, a choice
of optimum systems is of major importance.
If any single aspect of the Department of Defense programming
system could be stated as the most "radical" in terms of prior military
planning, it would be the degree of objectivity desired in the analytical
decision-making process. Decisions by their nature involve future
events. Objective decisions attempt to eliminate subjective elements
such as "intuition" and "experience" until value judgements enter into
the analysis. 7 his desire for objectivity is in part satisfied by
systematic analysis of output(effectiveness) versus input(cost). Ihe
primary objective of this cost-effectiveness analysis is the systematic
examination of alternative actions, in terms of cost and utility, and
the clarification of choices open to decision makers.
^
2Qene H. Fisher, "The Hole of Cost-Utility Analysis in Program
Budgeting," Program Budgeting , ed. David Novick, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 33.

Programming
Programming is the determination of resource inputs required to
accomplish a program. It concerns not only the requirements for a
particular year but also the requirements for the life of a program.
Inasmuch as cost estimates are almost meaningless when projected too
far into the "uture, the force structure is projected for eight years
and the financial requirements are projected for five years, .his
Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program is the foundation of
the Department of Defense programming system.
The Five Year i?orce Structure and Financial Program represents
the summation of all approved defense programs. It i3 expressed in
terms of three major components: (1) Programs; (2) Program elements;
and (3) Resource categories.
Programs . -Programs repre3ent broad, unifi<*d missions aggregated into
functional classifications. These are major defense "outputs". The
nine programs are presently classified as follows:
Program I -Strategic Retaliatory Forces
Program II -Continental Air and Mssile Defense Forces
Program III -General Purpose Forces
Program IV -Airlift and Sealift Forces
Program V -Reserve and Guard Forces
Program VI -Research and Development
Program VII -General Support
Program V Ill-Civil Defense
Program IX -Military Assistance Program
Program riements . -Major programs are subdivided Into program elements—
the smallest output presently controlled by the Secretary of Defense.
3
A program element is an integrated combination of manpower, equipment
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
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and facilities which in aggregate represent a certain military capability.
-arnples of program elements are: "Recruit Training, Navy"; and "Fleet
Ballistic Missile fystem". Them elements appear in the Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program in terms of missions, related tasks,
strength composition, major ec^uipment, approved force levels for eight
years, total obligational authority for five years and specific manpower
requirements for five years. For purposes of analysis and decisions
pertaining to program elements, their costs ere divided into three cost
categories:^
Research and Development—'those costs primarily associated with
research and development efforts including the development of a
new or improved capability to the point where it is ready for
operational use. These costs include equipment costs funded
under the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriation
and related Military Construction appropriation costs. Ihey
exclude costs which appear in the Military Fersonnel, Operation
and Maintenance and Procurement appropriations.
Investment—those costs required beyond the development phase
to introduce into operational use a new capabilit}*", bo procure
initial additional or replacement equipment for operational
forces or to provide for major modifications of an existing
capability. They include Procurement appropriation cost except
those associated with the operating category defined below, and
all Military Construction appropriation costs except those
associated with research and development. They exclude Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation; Military Personnel, and Operation
and Maintenance appropriations costs.
Operating-— those costs necessary to operate and maintain the
capability. These costs include Military Personnel, Operation
and Maintenance, and recurring Procurement appropriation costs
(such as replenishment spares).
The time phase relationship of these costs are shown in figures
1 and 2.
Resource Categories . -Although top level decisions are usually made on
the basis of the cost breakdown described above, many require a further
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Fig. 2 System costs time-phasing (.by fiscaf yea/s)





breakdown into implied resource requirements, This permits a convenient
link between the program elements and operating budgets which are
defined in terms of resource inputs. This resource dimension provides
the final closure to the input-output equation stated in terms of a
single common denominator—dollars. Thus, the sum of all program
elements constitutes total military output and the sum of all resource
categories constitutes total input. A resource category represents
either a single resource such as an item of equipment or a homogeneous
grouping of related resources. Most of the resources associated with
Navy operating costs are grouped in manpower categories and functional
categories. When possible these resources are expressed both in
financial and non-financial terras. Generally the homogeneous groupings
can only be expressed in dollar terms.
Program Change Proposals-- The Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program is a flexible plan, updated monthly, to reflect the latest
approved program changes. Flexibility is necessary to incorporate
new technological changes and improvements in weaponry. In the words
of Secretary MaNamaTa: 11 .. changes will have to be made in the projected
programs and entirely new projects, the need for which cannot now be
clearly foreseen, will have to be added. "5 Flexibility is not to be
confused with loose management. The content of the Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program is controlled through a Program Change
Proposal System which is an involved and detailed procedure whereby
program changes are reviewed and approved. Program Change Proposals
->U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Commitx,ee on
Appropriations, Hearings. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963.
















are submitted when new program elements are introduced, when changes
to existing elements are desired, or when any approved program
deviates beyond prescribed limits from its original time and cost
schedule. Each program change proposal contains an estimate of the
lifetime costs of the change broken down into the three cost categories
described above.
Budgeting
"...the purposes of budgets are as varied as the purposes of
6
men." This section is not intended as an elaboration of this truism.
Rather, the budget is examined as a single financial plan which
represents many purposes. For this type of examination, the budget
might be thought of as an agreement between three parties— the
Congress, the Secretary of Defense (representing the President) and
the Navy. The Congress is the "buyer" of Defense. The Sectary
is the prime contractor "selling" Defense. The Navy is one subcon-
tractor "performing" Defense. A tri-party agreement is used because
the "buyer" enters into "arms length" agreements with the subcontractors
during Congressional hearings. A simple analogy might be useful to
picture this relationship.
Congress, through the legislative process, represents the citizens
of the United States as the "buyers" of defense. The Constitution
places the responsibility to provide common defense in the hands of
Congress. Also, Congress has the power to determine the course of
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston:




uthe defense of the nation because It has control over defense
appropriations. In the words of The Honorable Carl fiayden: "Regardless
of the changes in Administration the continuing nature of the Congress
is a rudder which lends niaturity and stability to the direction of our
defense policies and requirements* "' By its power to withhold, limit,
or specify particulars, Congress in fact "draws up" the defense agreement
for the Department of Defense,
Ihe Constitution names the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces. The President, by virtue of the authority granted by
the National Security Act of 194-7, as amended, appoints a Secretary of
Defense as his principle civilian assistant for all matters relating to
the Department of Defense. The Secretary is delegated direction,
authority, and control over the Department of Defense. In this capacity,
the Secretary might be considered the "prime contractor" for defense.
The Navy can be viewed as a "subcontractor" in this tri-party
agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations, as the Senior Naval Officer,
is responsible only to the Secretary of the Navy. However, as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he is an advisor to the Secretary of Defense,
idie President and the Congress, fne National Security Act was carefully
written to ensure that the Congress had access to the military advice of
8
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress must legislate on the basis of the
best information obtainable fro.a all sources. Congressmen rely to a
great extent on the expert military advice of the members of the Joint
7Carl Hayden, "Ihe Senate Appropriations Committee Its Role in
Defense," Ihe Armed Forces Comptroller . Vol. 10, No. 13, (September, 1965).
3
'fce National Security Act of 19A9. Section 202 (c).
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Chiefs of Staff as well as other military office-s who testify during
budget reviews. "Representative Gerald R. Ford stated the dilemma of
9
his thirteen man Subcommittee on Appropriations for Defense as follows:
We Congressmen are required to make the best possible analysis
of these programs and policies and arrive at decisions which
Involve billions of tax dollars and possibly our national
se :urity. • • • one can argue that seven lawyers, one engineer, one
accountant, one newspaper publisher, and three businessmen lack
the qualifications to pass on a multi-billion dollar defense
appropriation measure.
It teaches us the need for heavy reliance on the representatives
of the Executive Branch—the civilian and military leaders of the
Department of Defense,
In addition to the advisory relationship, a direct financial
relationship exists between military budget sponsors and the Congress.
Funds are not authorized for the Department of Defense; rather, they
are authorized for specific; "entities" of the Department of Defense.
his type of authorization, in effect, limits the "prime contractor's"
control over the use of the "subcontractors". Iherefore, Congress
Indirectly exerts operating control over the Navy by structuring
authorizations into budget projects.
Several complications exist with the above tri-party agreement.
r he most serious complication is that it takes two forms. Hie Navy is
required to address and comply with the terms of the agreement in
program language when speaking to the Secretary of Defense and in
appropriation language when speaking with the Congress.
^Gerald R. Ford, "A Congressional View of Technology, " Data .










Budget. - Jhc Five 2 ear Force Structure end Financial Trograra
has become the basis for the preparation of the annual program budget*
Ideelly, the annual budge be a "one year slice" out of the long
ran,. ;; hs*©verf In practice the problem is not that simple, 'the




Stony changes occur in the Five Year
force 'tructur© during the budget preparation period which effects the
final siao and shape of the budget document which finally goes to
Congress. Prior to final preparation, the .'-resident and hi» economic
advisors must determine the overall size and shape of the Federal
Budget. he share which the Department of Defense receives may or may
not coincide with the financial program set forth in the Five ¥ear
Force Ftructur© and Financial Program, 'the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget sends a "policy letter1* setting forth a tentative budget
program in the summer, approximately on© year before the beginning of
the fiscal year for which the budget is being prepared* Final budget
decisions for the Department of Defense are often deferred until
December—just before the President makes his otat© of the Union
message to Congress*
Thus, the preparation of the program budget document involves
a penetrating reexamination of the data taken from the Five Year Force
"tructure and financial Program to obtain an overall balance between
programs and to stay within the final guidelines established by the
President.
1(Vlldavsky, or.,, cit.. p. 1%.
1XDavid J. Ott and Attiat F. C
(Washington: Ihe Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 17.
L1 Ott, Federal Budget Policy

17
Since 1962, the Defease budget has been presented to Congress
12
in terms of programs as well as appropriations. The program
presentation is in broad terms even though the interrelation with
appropriations is inserted into the record. The details of the budget
are submitted in the traditional appropriation format. These two
presentations represent the same financial plan—viewed in different
dimensions. More important is the fact that Congress reviews and
approves budget requests in terms of appropriations, not programs.
Administrative Budget . -This budget is the traditional annual document
which expresses, by appropriation title, the financial requirements
necessary to support programs approved in the Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Program. The specific format of the various appropriation
titles is specified by Congress and represents the manner in which it
wishes to review and ultimately approve requests for funds. The
administrative budget spans a three year period. The prior year, the
current year and the budget year are each presented for review. In
effect, this period covers the two years prior to the year for which
funds are being requested. Significant differences between the budget
year and prior years are usually questioned by Committee Members of the
13Subcommittee. ^ This is a paradox. The administrative budget is
reviewed and approved by comparison with past experience data even
though it is prepared on the basis of the most recent approved programs
•^House, Subcommittee on Appropriations, op^ cl t . . p. 2.
-^Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
The Navy Programming Manual . Part I, OPVAV 90-P-l, (September, 1964),
p. 1-5-1.






which are projected five years into the future. The Secretary
of Defense makes budget decisions based on costs projected ahead
in time j Congress makes budget decisions, based to a large extent,
on the past.^" In any case, Congress reviews budget requests and
approves funds in terms of appropriations, not programs. Consequently,
Department of Defense programs must be adjusted to reflect
appropriation limitations.
Annual appropriations expire on June 30 of the budget year.
Multi-year appropriations or continuing appropriations are granted
for items of construction or procurement which have long lead times
or construction periods.
The Navy receives funds in five categories under the following
Appropriation Titles: Military Personnel; Operation and Maintenance;
Procurement; Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy; and
Military Construction. Figure 3 shows the relationship which existed
between these Appropriation Titles and the Department of Defense Major
Programs for fiscal year 1966.
The discussion to this point has focused on the structural
aspects of the Department of Defense Program System and the appropria-
tion method of funding by Congress. It is not intended to be a
comprehensive study of either process; rather, it is intended to point
out the basic difference in the structures of the two views of the
same budget in an attempt to better appreciate the data collection
"^"See Wildavsky, op. cit. for an interesting discussion of the
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problems which are encountered during the execution phase of the
budget cycle. Before going to the next chapter, one additional
feature of appropriations should be mentioned. Congress frequently
writes "into the Act" certain restrictions which are binding on the
Military Services. A few examples of these "special interest" items
are given below to indicate the need for unusual "built in" fiscal
controls throughout the budget year. 1 -*
Operation and Maintenance funds totaling $141 million for the
Navy and $20.5 million for Marine Corps are available only for
the maintenance of real property facilities.
Not less than $7.5 million of Department of Defense funds
available for travel expenses shall be available only for
commercial passenger sea transportation service on American-
flag vessels.
Annual appropriation obligations during the last two months of
the fiscal year may not exceed 20 percent ( except for Reserve
Training programs ).
Of the funds provided Department oti Defense for the services of
the Military Air Transport Service, $100 million is available
only for procurement of commercial air transportation; §J+6,1
million of which is applicable to the Navy.
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Budget






The administrative budget -epresents the primary source of
funds available to the Navy. The budget document sets forth, in
rather precise terms, the intent of Congress regarding the use of
funds. Classification of funds in appropriation format represents a
positive method of controlling the use of funds in the manner
prescribed by Congress. Funds cannot be transferred from one "pocket"
to another without Congressional approval. Consequently, these
"pockets" of money receive considerable attention during both the
formulation and execution phases of the budget process.
Critics have accused government agencies of considering the
budget as an end unto itself rather than an effective planning and
2
control instrument. To the extent that budgets are used solely as a
device to obtain funds, this criticism is justified; however, due
consideration must be given to the fact that a budget represents much
more to a government agency than it does to a private firm. Aside from
being a financial plan, usually well founded and documented, it
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Financial
Management in the Navy
. HAVPFRS 10792-A (March 1962), p. 39.
2Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley &







represents the one "sale" of each year, so to speak, which produces
all the revenue. In this perspective, it represents a full year of
events—not just a plan which projects possible events based on
expected sales forecasts. Congress does not look favorably on
requests for changes during a budget year.
The relative inflexibility of the budget has encouraged its
users to think of it as a financial goal. In this respect, attention
has been focused on the maximum resources which the budget can obtain
rather than on the amount of money being spent for a specific amount
of resources. That budgets represent financial goals is evidenced by
the charts which can be found in nearly every manager's office. These
charts are financial plans for the current year. They are more
commonly called obligational plans oecause they depict the planned
and actual obligations of funds being managed. It is rare indeed to
find a plan which does not terminate at the approved budget allocation.
When actual obligations fall below the plan, managers usually take the
same expedient action as when they go above the plan. Staying on the
plan is the goal. This fact is due in many cases to the difficulty
encountered in formulating more precise performance-type budgets.
Performance budgeting is not always as objective as the name implies
because performance (output) is not always measurable.
An economic view of budgeting assumes that: "For any level of
either budget or objective, the choices that maximize the attainment









the cost of attaining that objective. H> This argument is the basis
for cost-effectiveness analysis. If objectives are fixed, measurable
and identifiable costs should be minimized to reach these objectives.
If on the other hand the objectives are not subject to quantitative
measure, then minimizing the cost of attainment becomes a pointless
expression. Navy organizational units are seldom assigned operating
objectives which are precise enough to identify absolute attainment.
Objectives for organizational units are often couched in vague terms
such as "provide support11 , "maintain a condition of readiness",
"operate and maintain", and "service the fleet". Specific and
measurable objectives seldom exist. Unlike operating budgets in
private industry which usually vary with output, Navy operating budgets
are essentially fixed in advance. Consequently, the bargaining during
budget reviews ultimately sets operating objectives by limiting the
amount to be spent on them. This amount is identifiable and measure-
able, and usually is thought of as the objective to be achieved. As a
result, government managers often concentrate on how much is left to
spend rather than on how much has been spent. In effect, maximun use
of available funds is the methods of achieving their goal—not
minimizing costs as advocated in business.
ihis "maximizing" spending philosophy receives a great deal of
criticism from business oriented financial managers. Why should an
agency spend a3 much as it possibly can on everything? Is there no
end to need? The painfully obvious answer is that "need" is not always
quantifiable. To the operating manager in the field, "need" means the
^Charles J. i-iitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (New York: Atheneura, 1965), p. 2.
''
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objective, expressed in dollar terms, in his approved operating budget.
This is not to imply that funds are spent simply because they have been
approved. Rather, funds are spent to improve the "end product" which
so often cannot be measured in terms other than dollars.
Program elements represent approved objectives. In broad terms
they can be quantified in terms of numbers of weapons such as aircraft
carriers. Aircraft carriers can be further equated to numbers of men,
armament, capacity, destructive capability and other terms. But, this
does not mean that the carrier is "ready" to fight a war. Grew training,
condition of equipment and many other factors, which are difficult if
not impossible to measure, determine the carrier^ "readiness". Up to
a saturation point, spending more on operating expenses is synonymous
to obtaining more readiness—the mission of the operating commander.
Failure to spend toward improved readiness would be tantamount to not
doing his be it job. Consequently, maximizing expenses up to budget
limitations usually is not considered wasteful by operating managers
unless the expenses are for unnecessary items. Accepting the existence
of this philosophy helps to "explain" the method in which the Navy
manages its finances. Navy management often reflects the desire to
maximize utilization of available resources rather than to minimize
expenses. Another characteristic evident in Navy financial management
is the traditional desire to "free" operating commanders from as many
logistic and administrative details as possible to permit them to devote
as much of their time as possible to the improvement and operations of
their units. Navy management also reflects the unique logistic problems
which the Navy encounters due to the mobility of its weapon systems, to
the variety and size of its ships and aircraft, and to their geographic
•..
25
dispersion around the world. Organizational units are frequently
thousands of miles away from the nearest logistic support ashore. As
a result, the planning find controlling of resources is a very difficult
task.^ The Navy' 3 organization reflects a delineation of logistic
responsibility along functional lines to cope with the complexities
of their logistic problems. Each Navy bureau is responsible for
specific types of logistic support for the entire Navy.
Organization; An Overview
The Secretary of the Navy exercises his responsibilities by
means of two main lines of control in a bi-linear system of organization.
One chain of command extends through the Chief of Naval Operations to
the operating forces and the other through bureaus and offices to the
support elements of the Navy. This bi-linear system envisions a "user-
producer" relationship between the operating forces (users) and the
5
support elements (producers).
The support element is further divided into two principle parts:
(1) The Naval Ifeterial Support Establishment; and (2) Other Supporting
Organizations. The Naval Material Support Establishment consists of
the Office of Naval Material (headquarters), the Bureau of Naval Weapons,
the 3ureau of Ships, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau
of Yards and Docks, and the shore activities assigned to these bureau
and office components. tTne Other Supporting Organizations include the
department of the Navy, Navy Logistic Task Force, Logistic
Support of the Navy
. (June, 1963), p. II-5.
5
The Navy has announced a plan to modify the present organization
such that supporting elements will report directly to Jhief of Naval
Operations. Also Naval Material Establishment bureaus are to be renamed.
I©•us e
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Bureau of Javal Personnel, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the
Office of Naval Research, offices of the Staff Assistants to the
Secretary of the Navy, and the shore activities assigned to these
components.
The operating forces consists of the several fleets, seagoing
forces, seafrontier forces, district forces, Military Sea Transportation
Service, and the shore activities and commands assigned to these
components.
Fach bureau and office has a functional responsibility to provide
support either directly or indirectly to the operating forces as well
as to each other. For example, the Bureau of Naval Personnel has
Navy-wide responsibility for the acquisition, training, assignment and
pay of military personnel. The Bureau of Yards and Docks has primary
responsibility for all facilities maintenance and engineering ashore.
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has responsibility for all medical
care throughout the Navy. In addition to technical responsibilities,
the bureaus are responsible for financial and resource management in
their respective functional areas.
Resource Management
Most of the operating costs of program elements and Naval
organizational units are funded by two appropriations: (1) Operations
and Maintenance, Navy; and (2) Military Personnel, Navy. Some support
equipment, normally considered an operating cost, is funded through the
"Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the Navy,








appropriation, Procurement, N^vy. These procurement items are
usually consumed during the course of the year and are recurring in
nature; therefore, they are classified as operating costs.
In order to simplify the the financial interrelation between
operating costs of program elements and organizational units, many
interrelations between bureaus and offices will be omitted. These
omissions will not detract from the purpose of this chapter which is
to examine the differences among the program view, the appropriation
view, and the Navy view of the same operating dollar. An additional
simplification is made by assuming that a program element consists of
a single hypothetical aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier is used
because it depends on nearly every bureau for some financial or
resource contribution in its normal course of operations.
Figure 4- depicts some of the major resource contributions made
by bureaus to the operating costs of this hypothetical program element.
These resources are either procured oy the bureaus or charged directly
to bureau fuad accounts. That is, the cost of these resources are not
charged against the ship' s operating budget. Two important points are
to be observed: (1) By far the largest dollar cost of operating the
carrier are not accounted for directly by the "user" (aircraft carrier),
that is, the bureaus provide the resources without reimbursement; and
(2) The bureaus provide the same type of resources to all other operating
units as well as to all shore activities. For example, the Bureau of
Naval Personnel allocates military personnel to all organizational units
in the Navy without financial reimburesement.
-
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Funds to obtain the resources described above are allocated to
8
the bureaus through appropriation title accounts," For example, the
appropriation Operabions and Maintenance, Wavy, is subdivided into
eight budget activities or accounts, 'dth one exception, each of
these budget accounts is assigned to a single responsible bureau and
represents the funds authorized to perform its operations and
maintenance mission. Bureau functional missions extend across Navy
organizational lines for technical and financial control. For example,
the Bureau of Yards and Docks manages the funds for facility maintenance
throughout the Navy. In a like manner, the Bureau of Ships manages
the funds for the cost of maintaining and operating the ships in the
Navy regardless of their organizational attachment.
Referring back to the user-producer concept of organization,
the bureaus might be thought of as central resource managers. The
"users" express their needs and the "producers" meet the needs as best
they can within the funds authorized. In many respects, the work of
some bureaus can be likened to that of inventory managers. Attention
is more often focused on aggregate resource requirements than on specific
organizational requirements. For accounting purposes, operating costs
are incurred when the resources are procured by the bureaus, not when
they are consumed by the "users". Once procured, the resources are
allocated among the "users" to obtain the best possible balance. This
balancing process is also complicated because the resources often must
°The Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of the Navy each are involved in the actual allocation of
funds between the Congress and the bureaus and they each influence the
final amounts received. However, this process is not material to the







be allocated to other "producer" bureaus ts well as to the "users".
Thus, the user-producer relationship is little ;nore than a "useful
concept" because "producers" are also "users" and in some cases, "users"
are also "producers". In any case, this aggregate resource management
leads to the maximizing spending philosophy because each manager wants
to "keep his bin i'ull" so to speak. The consumer of the resources
seldom has his "needs" fulfilled j therefore, both supply and demand
are limited only by budget authorizations for the specific resources.
Budgets prepared by the bureaus and offices are based on past
budgets, historical operating statistics, and anticipated changes in
the type and level of operations for the budget year. These budgets
can be considered in two parts. The first part consists of bureau
controlled resource requirements, that is, the funds required to obtain
the resources which the bureau's "furnish" to operating units and shore
activities without reimbursement. The second part of the budget
contains the funds required for allocation directly to organizational
units. This part represents the sum of the operating budgets of the
organizational units. The budget document does not make a distinction
between these two partsj therefore, the "producers" allocate both funds
and resources to organizational entities. Budgets prepared for operations
and maintenance do not identify organizational units. For example,
the Bureau of Ships portion of the budget for ship's Tuel is not
supported by detailed requirements for each ship; rather, the budget
contains "on the average" figures which portray the probable cost of
fuel for the budget year. Statistically, these average figures should
be quite accurate because they are made over a large population of ships.
A comparison of a single ship's fuel cost with the average would reveal
'
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a wide deviation. These same statistical averages are used to
allocate o perating costs to program elements. Here, considerable
error can be introduced because a small number of units a~e usually
involved and the statistics are less uccurate for the same but
smaller population.
The operating budgets prepared by organizational units include
only those costs which are incurred directly by the unit. This budget
represents the funds which are actually received by the ship or shore
activity. For ships, this budget covers only day-to-day purchases
of general usage material such as paint, rags, brooms, common-type
spare parts and other "general store" types of material available
through the Navy Stock System. In dollar value, this operating budget
represents only a fraction of the total operating cost of the unit.
The Bureau managed portion of operating costs are controlled through
allowance li3ts for military personnel, ordnance, special spare parts,
and medical supplies; through quotas for personnel training; and
through overhaul schedules for ship and aircraft overhauls. Port
facilities ashore are planned and provided on an aggregate basis to
meet the needs of all the operating forces. Control over the use of
shore facilities is provided by ship operating schedules and
assignments to homeports. Since ships assigned to different program
elements often utilize the same port facilities, the division of shore
station operating costs to the various program elements is even more
difficult than the association of direct operating costs to program
elements.
Financial control over expenses of shore activities is exercised
I
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by means of allotments or sub-allotments. Allotments are issued by
bureaus or offices to the Jo'-imanding Officer of the shore activity.
When more than one bureau function is carried on at an activity, several
allotments are issued to the Commanding Officer by the several bureaus.
As a result, the operating costs of the shore activity might be funded
by four or five different operating allotments, one for each bureau.






Conceptually, the Department of Defense programming system is
a comprehensive and continous cost-effectiveness analysis of a time
phased resource and financial plan. At the very highest level of
planning, total defense outputs, in the form of major programs, are
matched with potential aggressions. The specific types of aggressions
are matched with specific types of military output in the form of
program elements. Kach program element has a primary military mission.
Thus, major missions are subdivided into program missions which are
associated with specific weapon systems from each military service.
Program elements are the "measurable" mission oriented military outputs
of the Department of Defense. The weapon systems associated with these
outputs are subjected to rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis to select
those which provide the mo3t military output for a given cost, or those
which cost the least for a given military output. Once approved by the
Secretary of Defense, program elements are summed up in a Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Plan which represents the approved size
and shape of total defense output stated in both physical and financial
form for a prolonged period into the future.
All organizational units assigned to a program element are from
a single military service. However, the grouping of organizational
units in program element format does not always reflect the grouping






aircraft carriers of a certain class are grouped in one program
element regardless of their attachment to fleets. In the case of
shore activities, functional components of a single organizational
unit might be presented in several different program elements.
The program element is the smallest "entity" managed by the
Secretary of Defense and represents the entity for analysis, decision-
making, cost collecting and reporting. From the program viewpoint,
Navy operating costs merely represents the summation of all Navy
program element operating costs. Navy operating costs in summary form,
that is, in a form where the Navy is the entity, has little relevance
in program decision-making. The relevant data are those which present
program element co3tj those costs associated with "measurable" military
outputs. The Navy, as an entity, is not a measured military output
in the Department of Defense programming system.
ven though the Navy does not represent a decision-making
financial entity from the Department of Defense view, dollar "needs"
for the Navy are grouped as an entity for budgeting purposes. If
the total cost of the Five Year Force Structure for a given year is
in agreement with the President's fiscal program and if the estimated
cost of each program element is accurately described in the Department
of Defense Financial Program, the annual budget submitted to Congress
represents a one year "slice" out of the Five Year Plan. The budget
for each service i3 then a summation of all their program elements.
Budget formulation, however, begins with service requirements stated
in appropriation and budget project terms—not program element terms.







the Secretary of Defense all view Kavy operating requirements in terms
of appropriations and budget projects. The budget document is not
so regated into program elements. The entities for budget reviews
are Navy internal programs sue} as the ship overhaul program and the
facilities maintenance program. .iere, budget projects are the decision
entitles. Budget decisions on these en cities ore made after several
factors are considered. First, last year's approved budget provides
an essential guide. Previous expenditures often represent some sort
of performance standard, especially in those areas where industrirl
or commercial type "norms" are not applicable. In those areas where
rather accurate standards are available, the number of units or
degree of performance is still subject to debate.
Most program decisions do not provide monetary guidance for
budget projects. However, irogram decisions establish limits on
operating costs of the separate program elements; therefore, the total
operating budget of the Navy cannot exceed the sum of the operating
costs established for all Navy program elements. Tince operating
requirements of organisational units assigned to different program
elements cannot be directly identified in budget projects, there is
no method of superimposing program element limitations in budget form.
Consequently, program decisions on operating costs are not budget
decisions. In fact, budget decisions made in terms of budget projects
are translated into program financial plans. Also, Congress approves
budgets in terms of appropriations and budget projects—not programs.
As a result, financial management in the ftavy centers on budget entities
instead of program entities. From the standpoint of financial control





decisions are r,e~n as "expectation" decisions. They establish
expected levels of operating cost expenditures over the life of the
programs. If actual spending exceeds the expected spending level,
programs should be reviewed on the basis of new expected costs. For
planning purposes, operating budget requests should be matched against
expected budget costs. Present budgets do not permit such a " matching"
because program elements are not specifically identified in the budget.
Such a comparison would require budget entities to be subdivided into
organizational or functional entities which in turn could be grouped
into program element entities. The three dimensions of financial
management should "meet" in such a comparative review if the three
"views" are to interlock. Such a "meeting" cannot take place until
accounting entities or costing entities are developed which ere common
to the three dimensions of management.
The financial entity for operating costs in program format is
the program element. The entity in the budget format is the budget
project. The entity in t arms of operating control is fragmentations
of organizational operating costs. That is, the total operating cost
of an individual organizational unit is not jontrolled as an entity.
Rather, segments of operating costs are managed by different bureaus.
Some segments are managed in dollar terms, others in physical terms.
For fleet operating units, by far the largest dollar segment is
managed in resource terms. Consequently, the organizational unit is
a financial entity for only a small segment of its total operating
cost. Many of the Navy's sub-management systems use the organizational
unit cS the accounting entity (non-financial) for physical resources
but these accounts often cannot be translated into dollar equivalents
I.
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which are meaningful when compared to obligation data for budget
projects, fnis difficulty steins from the differences ia meaning and
measuring of operating costs in the three dimensions. These differences
are examined more in uhe next chapter.
The present Navy organization results in fragmented financial
management over operating costs, the total operating cost of an
individual operating organizational unit is seldom ever accumulated
or presented in budget form; consequently, total operating costs of
organisational entities are not managed by any single person or
2
organization.
In addition to the non-allignment of program elements with
appropriations and budget projects, Navy organization does not match
either the budget or the program structure. Consequently, a three
dimensional interrelationship emerges. Figure 5 depicts this
relationship in graphic form.
Die burden of three dimensional financial management exists
within bureaus when internal organizations overlap budget and program
financial categories. Figure 6 depicts such a condition at the Bureau
of Yards and Docks where internal organization does not "matchn either
budget projects or Department of Defense programs.
^-Certain industrial/commercial-type activities prepare total
operating budgets but these activities are financed by reiraburseable














































































































































































































































































































































































MEANINGS AND USES OF OPERATING COSTS

CHAPTER IV
DEFINITIONS AND BASIS FOR MEASURING OPERATING COSTS
Department of Defense Programming System
Program element operating costs are defined az those program
costs necessary to operate and maintain the capability. These costs
include Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance and recurring
Procurement appropriation costs (such as replenishment spares). Ihey
exclude Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; and Military
Construction appropriation costs.
This broad definition requires further clarification to convey
the total meaning of operating costs as construed and used for the
Department of Defense Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
Annual operating costs are measured in terms of total obligational
authority required to maintain the capability for one year. In a
real sense, this represents the total cost of resources ordered or
purchased for the use of operations during a period of one year. The
resources need not—and in many cases cannot—be consumed during the
period in whidi the costs are incurred because they may not have been
received. In a like manner, the cost of some resources consumed during
a given period may h?ve been incurred during a previous fiscal period.
This method of measuring operating costs has been criticized by
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, POD
Programming System




proponents for improved accounting prastices in the Department of
2
Defense.
The disadvantage in using total obligations! authority as a
measure of operating costs is that is has questionable meaning when
used to measure unit operating costs or to measure performance against
a standard. Theoretically, unit operating costs should be the ratio of
actual units of output divided by actual cost. Cost in this ratio
represents the value of resources consumed to produce or provide the
units of performance being measured. The ratio of actual unit
performance over the cost of resources ordered or purchased—the
ratio obtained when total obligt.tional authority is used for the base-
has questionable significance. There is little disagreement that,
where operating costs are involved, expired costs or expenses represent
the better method of measure. Recognizing this, Congress now requires
all federal agencies to utilize accrual accounting methods wherever
3practicable. Accrual accounting distinguishes between costs end
expenses and recognizes expenses only in the accounting period when
they are incurred. In the case of Navy operating costs, expenses
would be recognized in the period when the resources were consumed
rather than when they were ordered. To date, the Department of Defense
has not fully complied with this requirement.
By definition, program element operating costs exclude all costs
^Robert N, Anthony, "New Frontiers in Defense Financial
Management," The Federal Accountant. (June, 1962), p. 16.
3
•'U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Financial Management in the Federal Government . 87th Cong., 1st. Sess.,







of facilities, equipment and machinery which are not normally consumed
in their entirety during a period of one year. This follows the
general pr&ctioe in the federal government of not charging imputed
depreciation and amortization costs to operations. Business-type
budgets with asnet accounting and depreciation allowances are used for
certain industrial/commercial type activities in the Hevyj but, even
these activities do not price their products and services to recover
all capital investment costs. An extension of the depreciation
concept to all facets of government operations has questionable value.
4
Defense services are not priced and capital expenditures are not
financed through specific capital borrowings; therefore, the necessity
for determining imputed costs of operations resulting from capital
acquisitions does not exist. It might have advantages in making
administrators more conscious of the total cost impact of their
5
operations, but this de,.;rce of financial sophistication has not yel
been introduced in the Department of Defense.
.'
1
1 1 ,j 1 n \ ~trative Budge t
Budget requests are stated in terms of new obligations!
authority. This differs from total obligational authority by the
amount of obligational authority "carried forward" from previous
appropriation grants. This type of "carry over" authority does not
exist for annual appropriations ffhich expire ut the end or each budget
6
year.






uNavy annual operating costs are funded by annual appropriations.
Since funds authorized for operating costs cannot be carried forward
to the next budget year, total and new oblige.tional authority are
usually numerically equal. One exception to this equality occurs when
funds are transferred out of working capital accounts to operating
7
accounts. In this case total obligational authority exceeds new
obligational authority by the amount transferred. Normally, however,
the cost of operations is the same in both the program and the budget
dimensions.
Operating costs must be assigned to an accounting entity to have
meaning. In program terras, operating costs are assigned to program
elements. In budget terms, operating costs are assigned to the Navy.
More specifically, operating costs are assigned to Navy programs or
8
Navy functions. This definition of operating cost represents a
category of the total operating cost of the Navy—not the total
distributed operating cost of the program or functional entity. For
example, medical cere is a function which represents a common accounting
entity in both the program and budget dimension. The operating cost of
this entity in program terms consists of all operating costs associated
with the performance of medicare. This includes such costs as military
personnel pay, facilities maintenance, vehicle maintenance, utilities,
as well as the cost of medical supplies and civilian pay associated
directly with medical care, in budget terms the operating cost of
medical care includes only direct costs and excludes such costs as











military pay, facilitis maintenance and other functional josts which
• budgeted for in other :Javy programs. In the program view, medical
CLj?e is considered an entity. In the budget viev/, reedical care is
considered one category of Navy operating costs. When the Navy is the
costing entity, there is no need to allocate various functional costs
to the different cost categories or programs. In the program vi^w,
medical care is an "output" and total operating costs should be
allocated to the "outputs". Thus, a major difference between these
two views is the costing entity.
Management of Navy Opera '.ions
An operating unit is an organizational subdivision or entity
which is responsible for the execution of a segment(s) of a Navy
program or function." Operating costs of Navy organizational entities
10
are not managed entirely through operating budgets. Bureau funded
resources, a major part of operating costs, are managed by means of
direct resource allocation or by means of allowance lists and schedules
of overhaul and repair.
Operating budgets for organizational units ashore include all
operating requirements except military personnel costs and a limited
amount of cost for bureau furnished items; consequents, operating
performance of these units can be measured in terms of operating
budgets by adding statistical costs of personnel and bureau furnished






at of operating performance for fleet units la more
difficult for two reasons? first, a large rather than a snt.ll portion
of their direct operating coats are furnished by bureaus; and second,
Lrect operating costs, in the forms of support and service ashore,
are not charged to the operating units. As a result, operating
performance is usually measured in functional or resource categories
of operating costs. For example, operating performance might be
measured in terras of gallons of fuel per steaming or flying hour. The
cost of operating is a physical measure which can be converted to
dollars. When resource consumption is used to measure operating costs,
the measured cost is an expense of operations. Therefore, to the extent
that the term "operating cost" has a useful meaning for fleet units,
the measure of cost is expired cost for bureau furnished resources
and obligations for costs Tianag^d directly by the organizational unit.
Operating performance data are reported to management via many
management data systems—each designed to measure a specific category
of operating performance. Pome of these data systems report costs in
terms of obligations and others report in terms of physical units.
Those which report in terms of obligations are integrated, to some
extent, with the Navy Accounting System. The others are either
complimented by the Navy x^ccountlng System or completely independent
from it. In any case, the term operating cost , as used in measuring
operating performance, refers to categories of operating costs
associated with the organizational entity. The basis for measuring




omtAUNG QOSfS I - ASWLtSIS
Ihe planning process places considerable reliance upon cost-
effectiveness analysis for selecting the best weapon-system from
alternatives and for selecting the best mix of systems to achieve
desired outputs, 'hese selections are difficult choices because a
long list of reasonable alternatives can usually be developed to
accomplish a given mission, Each alternative is coaplex in itself
and is often dependent on other sys teres already in use. On occasion,
new alternatives are Interdependent as well as dependent on existing
systems. These facets add considerable complication to the analysis.
Decisions always involve future costs and capabilities of the
systems under study. :"ince neither of these quantitative inputs are
easy to determine with any degree of accuracy, various degrees of
uncertainty exist from the very beginning of the analysis. rstimated
costs, although extremely difficult to determine, may cause less
difficulty at the beginning of the analysis than the criteria for
effectiveness.
Ihe effectiveness af weapons during wartime are subject to a
•at many factors, '"heir accuracy, flexibility, durability,
^Kalph M. TUcker, "Cost-Tffectiveness-Fact and Fancy," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. (September, 1964.), p. 75.
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reliability, mobility, and many other qualitative factors must be
considered in addition to their destructive or mission capability.
The difficulty in weighing these factors is that people place
different values on the same factor. The "rational" solution to this
"human" problem is to establish arbitrary groundrules or specifications
which most nearly "satisfies" the proponents of the alternative weapon-
systems. The establishment of these working specifications is the
most crucial aspect of the analysis. Any bias in the specifications
most surely predetermines the outcome. The inability to assign
"absolute values" to effectiveness is considered the most limiting
feature of quantitative analysis and has caused the most vocal
criticism of this aid for making military decisions. O.M. Solandt
reasons: "Where no one has any practical experience of the kind of
war that may be forged in the future, the self-confident scientist
is tempted to step in and make his own assumptions and simplifications.
These may be realistic, but I am afraid they are too often adapted to
fit his models and theory. "^ Gene H. Fisher expresses a different
view of the limitation: "...long-range- planning decision problems
must ultimately be resolved primarily on the basis of intuition and
judgement. 7/e suggest that the main role of analysis should be to
3try to sharpen this intuition and judgement."
Objectively the analysis has limiting constraints on both cost
O.M. Solandt, "Concluding Remarks," Journal of the Operations
Re search Society of America
. (November-December, I960), p. 859.
3Gene H. Fisher, "The Role of Cost-Utility Analysis in Program
Budgeting," Program Budgeting, ed. David Novick, (Washington: U.S.




and effectiveness. The law of diminishing returns limits the practical
cost and the law of diminishing value limits effectiveness. The
first law assumes that resources are in limited supply and therefore
the more of an item produced, the more costly it becomes. The second
law rests on the physiological fact that the more of an item you have,
the less valuable the next becomes. This applies to weapons of war
as well as other commodities. Jlearly then, the analyst can approach
the problem in one of three ways: (1) fixed cost, (2) fixed effective-
ness, or (3) a best balance between cost and effectiveness.
7/hen cost analysis is used to select between alternatives, one
factor, cost or effectiveness, must be fixed to permit analytical
comparison. During peacetime, many military choices are limited by
cost criteria; that is, budget limitations are given in the form of
"guidelines" and program change proposals are limited to the cost of
present programs which they expect to replace. Under such limitations,
competing programs are more often those which do a "better" job for
the same cost than those which do the "same" job for less cost. In
either case, a limit must be determined by someone in authority other
than the analyst. If a cost limit is selected (budget ceiling), the
problem is to maximize the effectiveness which can be obtained for the
fixed cost. If strategic capability (effectiveness) is predetermined,
the problem is to obtain it for the minimum cost.^ Thus, optimizing,
either maximizing or minimizing, is the end purpose of the analysis.
Once the problem has been designed, estimated costs of the weapon-
^•Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear fee . (.New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 3.
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system must be determined for the input to the co3t side of the
problem. As mentioned in Chapter II, costs are cats^oriaed as one of
torse typeo: research and development! investment; and total operating
costs over the expected life of the system. Since long term project-
ions of cost roe difficult to make with any degree of precision,
costs or financial estimates are projected for only five years which
5gives a good approximation of full costs.
How are operating costs estimated that far into the future?
Usually by adjusting historical operating cost data for similar
programs. More specifically, historic unit cost factors are applied
to estimated units of future operating requirements. These historic
costs might be considered "irrelevant" because they relate to the
past; yet, they are "most relevant" because there are no better
guidelines available. Consequently, operating cost estimates for
future weapon- systems relay heavily on "experience" data on present
systems.
The magnitude of operating costs, in comparison with research
and development, and investment, varies with each weapon-system. The
operating costs may exceed the sum of the other two. Secretary of
Defense Mctfamara has expressed concern over the gross inaccuracy of
estimates on weapon- systems and has stressed the necessity for more
7
reliable cost figures. A weapon-system, selected on the basis of a
'U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings. Department of Defense Appropriations for
1963. 87th Cong., 2nd Se3s., 1962, p. 3.
6
David Novick, System and Total Force Cost Analysis
.
(Santa
Monica: The Rand Corp., 1961), p. 2.
Ibid ., p. 37.
,
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cost-effectiveness analysis, may well be the wrong selection if the
estimates are too far out of line. Further, since the validity of
operating cost data cannot be ascertained until after the system is
selected and placed in operation, careful and accurate estimating is
a major concern during the planning and programming phase.
Cost-effectiveness analysis contains many uncertainties in
varying degrees. Uncertain or inaccurate cost estimates are but one
of the many errors introduced into the analysis and they often are
the least erroneous of the factors used. The effect of uncertainties
can be evaluated in comparison problems by conducting sensitivity tests.
These tests vary input factors such as cost estimates and change
criteria assumptions to determine the effect which they have on the
Q
results. 7 If the problem is sensitive to certain estimates or
assumptions, a change in these factors usually changes the order of
preference of the systems under comparison. These tests help to
substantiate a preferred system when changes in the estimates or
assumptions do not change the order of preference.
On rare occasions, the cost-effectiveness ratios of two or more
systems are nearly the sa~ne. In these cases the sensitivity tests
are of limited value because when cost estimates are varied up or down
the preference order changes with the estimates. Accurate estimates
of both the cost and the effectiveness are then the key factors in the
°G.H. Fisher, "The Problem of Uncertainty.
"
Concepts and Procedures





final decision. It might appear that when competing systems have
nearly equal cost-effectiveness ratios the system with the under-
estimated costs would have an advantage in the selection process.
It will be seen in the next chapter that this is not the way to "beat
the system".
Most of the discussion to this point has been concerned with
selecting from new systems. In many cases, new systems replace exist-
ing systems or some part thereof. Under these conditions, the analysis
compares the existing system as one possible choice. The analysis
changes only in the fact that the present system's future estimated
costs include only the operating costs. The sunk costs of the present
system are not relevant to the comparison because they cannot be
recovered under any conditions of the outcome. The new proposal
must be considerably better than the existing system in order to
overcome the added burden of investment costs.
10Tucker, loc. cit., p. 78.
^Charles T. Horngren, Accounting for Management Control :




OPERATING COSTS IN PROGRAMMING
Programming might be considered us step two of planning. It
involves the more detailed steps required to eventually implement
the decisions made during the planning phase. At this point,
objectives have been established and courses of action to meet
these objectives have been selected. Programming must integrate the
approved courses of action into the overall defense program.
strategic objectives and cost-effectiveness factors used in
planning gives way to timing and resource limitation factors in
programming. Time- phased cost requirements for the various programs
are significant determinates of how much and how fast new or changed
1
programs can be introduced into the overall financial structure. New
programs cannot be injected into the system without consideration of
overall financial limitations. A fixed limitation does not exist but
the general economic and world situation certainly sets the framework
for overall spending policies established by the President. Prior to
the Vietnam crisis, it was evident that a rather level spending policy
had been established for defense at somewhere around fifty billion
dollars per year. The overall impact of new program decisions are
determined during the planning phase but detailed adjustments must be
ST. P. Large (ed.), Concepts and Procedures of Cost Analysis




programmed periodicly to keep the Five Year Force Structure in step
with the actual funds granted yearly by Congress.
Since program elements are the building blocks of the Force
Structure, they must each have a time-phased financial plan which
reflects the estimated total obligation authority required on an annual
basis for five future years. Annual increments are the necessary base
for estimation and control purposes because funds are budgeted on an
annual basis.
Program changes often involve the replacement of components of
existing program elements. In such cases, the replaced components
cannot be phased out until their replacements are operational. To do
otherwise would upset the balance of forces in the Force Structure.
Consequently, physical progress of new program components under
development are a key factor in determining when old components can
be phased out. Manpower resources from an old component are sometimes
planned for a new component other than the one which is replacing the
old. Under these circumstances, critical interrelations are established
between what otherwise might be independent program changes. Thus,
constant reprogramming is necessary to keep within financial and
resource limitations.
Hie magnitude of the financial complexities of programming are
almost incomprehensible and certainly would be unmanageable if it were
not for automatic data processing. Needless to say, the problem reaches
near impossible proportions when cost estimates for program elements
are found to be completely erroneous. For any given force level and
!,i a . : , ;,
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activity rate, operating costs are fixed over relatively short
intervals of time. It must be assumed that operating levels are fixed
at some predesignated position for each program element in order to
arrive at an estimated operating cost for a period of one year. There
is a definite relationship between the operating costs and force levels
as well as between operating costs and levels of operation of these
forces. The problem is the determination of these relationships.
Certain costs included in the definition of operating costs do not
vary with either forces or level of operations. For example, the
removal of a squadron of aircraft from an Air Station would not
necessarily be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the size
or the cost of maintaining the remaining facilities. Therefore, the
total operating cost of the station might well not change with this
change in force level. In a like manner, a change in the operating
rate of the squadrons would probably not result in a change in the
operating cost of the station.
If accurate operating cost data are available from several
previous years, cost relationships of and between variable can often
2
be established by building cost models. These models can be developed
by using one of many statistical techniques. These techniques develop
normal cost equations based on historic data which relate total costs
to the variables which effect total cost. These mathematical models
have several serious limitations. First, the variables can seldom be
Isolated from other variables to determine their lndividu.1 impact on
2
R. L. Petruschell, "An Introduction To Intimating Relationships,"
Concepts and Procedures of Cost Analysis , ed. J. P. Large (Santa Monica:
The Rand Corp., 1963), p. IV-1.
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total costs. Second, the variables are often interrelated. This
greatly complicates the problem because it necessitates establishing
other models which relate these variables. As a result, a whole
family of models are often required to obtain any reasonable prediction
3
of the dependent variable. In the case of program elements, the
numbers of forces as well as the activity rate of these forces or
their attendent weapon- systems effect total operating costs. Therefore,
rather specific relationships between the variables which effect total
operating costs have to be developed before cost models can be used to
predict costs.
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, cost models can b. very
useful for the degree of accuracy required in many planning problems.
Reliable statistical data on operating costs are required to use
this tool of management.
3"
Tilliam J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysi s






OPERATING COSTS IN BUDGET PREPARATION AND REVIEW
Conceptually, program decisions made by the Secretary of Defense
in the programming process are budget decisions. Approval of the Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Program and changes thereto are
committments to support a budget request for the necessary funds to
maintain the programs. In this respect, the budget merely represents
a perspective from an appropriation and budget activity point of view.
The programs which the budget encompasses have already been approved
and their total financial requirements are known through the updated
version of the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
The budget appears to be a one year "slice" out of the Five Year
Program. In practice it is not that simple. The budget sent to
Congress must fit into the latest financial ceiling determined by the
President and his staff. In addition, the budget must "fit" the format
in which the Congress wants to perform reviews. Many of the "rules of
thumb" used by Congressional staff members during the budget review
have no counterpart meaning in the program structure and vice versa.
Consequently, budget requests must be adjusted and formulated so as to
withstand the scrutiny of the reviewers. Appropriations are often
based on past performance rather than future expectations.
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program





Annual budgets are prepared essentially in the same manner as
before the adoption of the Department of Defense programming system.
Operating requirements are prepared on the bases of anticipated activity
for the budget year. Financial requirements are supported on the basis
of functional performance standards such as flying hours, steaming
hours, workload data, vehicle miles, and various other standards that
have been developed over many years from the various management systems.
Operating budget submissions received from field organizational units
are not identified with the program elements to which they are assigned.
The bureaus and offices merge field budget requirements with their own
and development Navy program requirements along budget project lines.
Last year's budget plus or minus approved program changes is often
the basis for the new budget. Variances from the last budget are given
careful review and justification is prepared to explain any increases
or decreases. Specific attention is given to those "rules of thumb"
which have been used in past budget reviews at the various review
levels. Operating budgets are not prepared in terras of program
elemeat operating costs. Rather, after the budget is prepared, it
is "allocated" to program elements based on a predetermined and
"consistent" allocation procedure. To the extent that budget amounts
can be related to specific program elements, they are directly allocated.
In those oases where direct identification is not possible, budget
project amounts are allocated on a "rational" and "auditable" basis.
A primary concern during allocation is that the amounts allocated do
not exceed the amounts allowed in the Five Year Force Structure and
Financial Program. Since the estimates in the financial plan are
'NAVPERS 10792-A, op. cit . . p. 61.
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updated by allocating the budget year estimate, the variation from
year to year should be accounted fnr by approved changes or adjustments
made during the previous year.
The primary controlling feature of the Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Program, as it concerns operating budgets, is the
numerical force figures it contains. Force decisions provide the base
for operating budget preparation—not the dollars estimates contained
in the approved financial plan. That is, operating budget requests
a..*e justified on the basis of performance factors regardless of the
approved estimates in the financial plan. Consequently, program
element operating cost estimates in the financial plan are not of
major import during budget preparation as long as total Ilavy operating
costs do not exceed the sum of the operating cost estimates in the
financial plan.
Budget reviews by the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of
Budget are normally held concurrently. These reviews are in budget
category format not in program format. Budget decisions made by the
Secretary of Defense—in budget format—are "injected" into the Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Program.^ This indicates that
program decisions are not always budget decisions.
The Congress, although interested in the progra; I proach to
budgeting end budget analysis, has indicated that it has no intention
of changing its present method of reviewing and approving budgets in
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
The Navy Programming Manual




term3 of budget projects and other appropriation groupings. 4 This
being the case, operating costs grouped In budget categories will
remain a significant part of the budget process.
^WlVEXOS P-24.16, op. cit . . p. 2-12.

CHAPTER VIII
OPFRAriNG COSTS AND PROGRAM CONTROL
Programming is conoerned with policy objectives, long-range
projections, and analysis methods that go far beyond the scope
of traditional budget procedures. Programing, however, may
remain merely a useful academic exercise unless it is implemented
through the budget, which should provide an essential link
between policy and administration. Finally, both programming
and budgeting depend in essential ways on the information that
can be obtained only *)irough perceptive reviews of past
rformance.l
Arthur Smithies, a recognized authority on the subject of program
budgeting, envisions programming as a budgetary control device, not
just a process which gives scope and direction to budget policy and
plans. This may appear to be a moot point but it has significant
implications on the manner in which the programing concept is used.
If It i c ; used only to give general direction and scope to future
budgets, it implies rather broad control over administrative budgets.
In this manner, it might be comparable to the type of policy direction
often given by a Board of Directors of a large firm—broad policy
direction. Programming used in this manner envisions decentralized
budget planning within broad guidelines established by top management.
If on the other hand it is used as a detailed planning device to
accomplish specific objectives within specific time frames, it implies
rigid control over budgetary planning.
1 Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the Program Budget,"
Program Budgeting , ed. David tfovick, ('Washington: U.S. Government




When the programming system was first introduced in the
Jirtreent of Defense, it was presented as a tool for making broad
military decisions. In 1962, Kugh MoOullough, then Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense ( Programing ) stated:
Ihere seems to be son-ie apprehension that the systers of
reporting obligations and expenditures will have to become
much more complex in order to satisfy the requirements of
both structures, ito thing of this nature is intended; on the
contrary, it is hoped that some of the reporting now going
on can be eliminated. Hie essential point, to remember is that
programming does not require financial preciseness. Reasonable
statistical approximations are quite adequate for the purpose
and these conceivably could be provided with relatively little
difficulty.
2
"Ibis statement indicates that programming would not be linked directly
with budget reporting—or at least that it would not require the
preciseness of budget reporting. It implies that programming is a
process somewhat similar to the capital budgeting process in industry.
fhis implication is drawn from the statistical nature of the financial
data requirements. Budgeting may not require financial preciseness
but progress against budget plans during the execution phase is usually
measured in rather precise terras—not statistical approximations. lb©
requirements indicated above seem to fit the description of the broad
policy form of programming.
Several years after the adoption of the programming system, the
former Assistant Secratary of Defense (Comptroller), spoke on the
subject of financial data a follows: "The other less-than-satlsfactory
aspect of the programming system is our machinery for measuring
,
and
''Hugh ttc:)ullou£h, "lew Concepts in Defense Planning, Programming
and Budgeting," The f'edqral Accountant . JLL $ (September, 3-962), p. 81.
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estimating cost.""5 [italics added.]
The difference between "statistical approximation" and
"measuring" is subject to debate, however, the face that dollar amounts
authorized by the Secretary of Defense for individual ;. rograra elements
cannot be exceeded indicates that "measure" means rather accurate
measure—at least as accurate as that required for budget management.
It is reasonable to assume that the Department of Defense programming
system has been designed as a rigid control system.
he essential elements of a control system are; (1) Predetermined
goals; (2) A means of measuring activity; (3) A means of comparing
activity with goals; trnd (4) Corrective action.
4.
.he Department, of Defense programming process determines goals
in two forms: (1) In terms of forces, that Is, manpower, weapons, and
facilities; and (2) In terms of dollars, the common denominator of
all the resource 3 which make up the forces. As discussed earlier, an
inherent difficulty in setting goals in terms of numbers is that
military worth is seldom measurable in terms of numbers alone. Other
factors auch as intensity of training, material condition and morale
of personnel also determine the quality and value of military output.
With the exception of unmanned weapon-systems, unqualified goals are
difficult to establish because of these qualitative factors. As a
result, dollar approximations of the cost required to obtain an
^Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1965), p. 64.
Joseph L. Mas3ie, Essentials of Management (Fnglewood: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 65.
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"acceptable" degree of readiness in the past are often used as dollar
goals. For example, the value of experienced personnel cannot be
measured directly but the cost of retaining an acceptable level of
experience can be expressed in dollar terms based on past experience.
Consequently, the force structure, even though expressed in numbers,
must be married to a financial program which gives it definitive size.
In theory, the two plans, force structure and financial program,
represent an equality at any point in time.
Using the above equality in a program element, the total
operating cost for one year should represent a specific bill of
materials which includes manpower requirements, fuel, spare parts
and all the other resources needed to operate the weapons in the element
for one year. Due to the size and complexity of program elements,
central control over specific resources is not practicable. Therefore,
if the Secretary of Defense is to exercise control over operating
costs of program elements, it is generally far more practical to do
it with dollars than with specific resource lists.
Ihe Department of Defense programming system supposedly exerts
some control over program operating costs. If the cost of any program
exceeds certain monetary thresholds, program change proposals must
be processed to the Secretary for approval. In the case of operating
costs, these threshold limitations apply to single year costs as well
as to lifetime costs of program elements. This type of control implies
that a procedure exists to determine the annual costs, on a reasonable
basis, and that some type of progress report is prepared which portrays
actual versus estimated operating costs of program elements. Such is
'I
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not the case. Progress reports are required for manpower levels,
force levels, major procurement, and for construction line items,
5
but not for operating costs. The Secretary of Defense receives
"feedback" reports on operating costs, in terms of program elements,
only at the time the Financial Program is updated to reflect the
latest approved budget. ftiis is "before the fact" information
"allocated" to program elements on a "rational basis". Actual
program element operating costs are not now compared with estimated
operating costs.
This lack of acceptable feedback information on program element
operating costs indicates a serious weakness in the programming
system. If this system is to be other than an "academic exercise",
actual cost data are necessary to compare progress with planned
program objectives, 'fhese objectives are stated in dollar equivalents
in the Financial Plan. Program objectives for weapon-systems "in
being" are stated in terms of operating costs in the Financial Plan.
Consequently, actual program element operating costs must be compared
with estimated costs to measure goal achievement. In the words of
Secretary McNamara:
The effective management of approved programs also requires
a reporting system that keeps top officials constantly informed
of the progress being made in achieving established objectives—
in both physical and financial terms on the basis of program
entities and not merely in terms of bits and pieces of programs
financed in various appropriation accounts."
^Department of Defense, Office of tha Secretary of Defense, POD
Programming System
. DOD Directive 7045.1, (February 13, 1964,).
"Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1,1960 to
June 30, 1961, "Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year








Navy accounting serves three broad purposes: (l) to report
on use and status of funds to the Bureau or Office responsible for
the appropriation or subhead from which the funds were granted; (2)
to assist in controlling commitments, obligations, and expenditures in
order not to exceed the limitations imposed by appropriations and
subdivisions there of pursuant to Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes,
2
as amended, (31USC 665); and (3) to provide functional cost analysis
data for determining efficiency of operations or other analysis
required by management officials.
The accounting system can be thought of as being composed of two
separate but integrated systems. An appropriations accounting system
provides the fiscal accounting and a cost accounting system provides
the managerial accounting. These systems are integrated to the extent
that single source documents placed into the system at the field level
often serves both systems. Some source documents are placed into the
cost accounting system which do not enter the appropriation system and
vice versa. Field activities insert documents for "statistical charges"
•4luch of the information for this chapter was obtained from the
Navy Comptroller Manual .
2




which represent costs of resources used at the field level which have
already been paid for by the various management bureaus. Strict
accountability for statistical changes usually is not enforced manage-
ment reports do not warrant that degree of accuracy. As a result, the
appropriation fund accounting is considered the official accounting
system.
Appropriation Accounting
The Navy receives funds from Congress in six broad appropriations:
(1) Military Personnel; (2) Operations and Maintenance; (3) Procurement;
(4.) Research, Development, Test and Valuation; (5) Military Contruction;
and (6) Revolving and Management Funds.
The appropriations are subdivided to limit their respective use.
For example, Military Personnel is subdivided into four major divisions:
(1) Military Personnel, Navy; (2) Military Personnel, Marine Corps;
(3) Reserve Personnel, Navy; and (4.) Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps.
Ihese major divisions are further subdivided into major activities
which more specifically identifies the purpose of the funds. For
example, Military Personnel, Navy is separated into four major activities:
(1) Pay and Allowances; (2) Subsistence in Kind; (3) Permanent Change
of Station Travel; and v4) Other Military Personnel Costs.
Many of the appropriations are further divided into various sub-
heads, projects, and budget activities to provide greater identification
•^Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Budget Digest .
NAVSO P-1355, (November 30, 1965), p. 4-2.
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of the specific purpose or function for which the funds are to be used.
Unless Congress specifies otherwise in the Appropriation Act, a limited
degree of flexibility is granted to the Administration to transfer
funds between appropriations. Likewise, a degree of flexibility exists
between the various subdivisions unless specified otherwise in the law.
Congress must be informed of any sizeable reprogramming.
Ihese subdivisions serve a useful function other than identifica-
tion. Each, bureau, office or project manager has specific accountabil-
ity for one or more subheads. In most cases, a single bureau is account-
able for at least one major activity of an appropriation.
All operating costs of the Navy are funded in three appropriations.
Two of these; Operations and Maintenance, Navy; and Military Personnel,
Navy; are considered operating expense appropriations in their
entirety. In addition, some operating costs are funded by the appro-
priation, Other Procurement Navy.
Military Personnel. Navy
The Bureau of Naval Personnel administers these funds centrally
from Washington, that is, they are not allocated to other levels of
organization. All payments for these costs are charged to open
allotments held by the bureau. Accountability is maintained through
a system of subsidiary pay and allowance accounts maintained for each
person receiving pay. Disbursement is made through accountable officers




made to Navy personnel are reimbursed by the Bureau* s funds designated
for this purpose. Tt is importa>r ote that dollar payroll accounts
are maintained for Individuals and not for "lavy organizational units.
The organizational unit to ^hich an individual is attached to at the
time of payment is not carried forward to the accounts in Washington.
Operations afld, ^in,tenance t Navy
Ihis particular appropriation is parcelled out to nearly every
bureau and office in the Havy. It provides the funds to purchase all
resources required to operate and maintain the Navy except Military
Personnel and a few items procured from Other Procurement, wavy.'
In chapter It it was seen that the functions of the bureaus and
offices of the Navy extend horizontally across the organizational
structure of both the operating forces and the shore activities.
Generally speaking, the bureaus prepare the budgets and allocate the
funds to fulfill their functional responsibilities. For example,
the Bureau of Ships prepare o the budget for operating and maintaining
all Navy ships regardless of where these ships are located or assigned.
Likewise, t&e Bureau of Xards and Docks prepares the budget and
adiainisters the funds for all the maintenance of facilities, utilities
and transportation regardless of location or organizational attachment.
As a result, every organizational activity is funded through at least
two and in most cases more than bureau allotments. In addition, every
unit consumes resources wnlch are funded directly by at least one bureau.
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Budge
t
Digest. MAVSO P-1355, (November, 1965), p. 55.
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Direct funding and management of operating resources by oureaus
take many forms. Fxamples of bureau managed functions or resources
are ship and aircraft fuel, ship and aircraft overhaul, forms and
publications, training films, transportation of things, ordnance
and ammunition, control of specialized parts and electronics and
personnel. Central planning and control of these items are .aore
economical than organizational unit control. Ihe difficulty with
the central fund management is tnat the cost of the resources are
charged to appropriation accounts at the time of purchase and the
organizational units which will eventually consume the resources
are not identified at the time of purchase. As a result, operating
costs in the budget dimension are incurred without knowledge of the
organizational unit which requires the cost. Final consumption of
these resources is often identified by means of the statistical cost
accounting system or one of the Navy management systems but these
systems are not synchronized with the official financial accounting
and reporting system.
Statistical source documents, representing consumption of
bureau managed resources, are inserted into the cost accounting
system long after the resources are purchased. Consequently, the
cost accounting system cannot be used to identify operating costs on
a basis which Is consistent with the official obligation and
expenditure accounts. Further, the cost accounting system cannot be
used to identify costs of program elements because these costs are
also required on an obligations! basis.
The bureaus do not centrally manage all the funds they receive

12
for their respective functional responsibilities. Larjje portions are
alloted to field activities, ships, squadrons and headquarters for
local administration. Ihese alloted funds generally provide for the
pay of civilian labor and the cost of all resources consumed except
those vrhich are furnished by the bureaus. The source documents for
these costs are placed into both the appropriation and cost accounting
systems when the funds are obligated. For all practical purposes,
obligations and expenses are 3ynonorooua at this level of organization.
These costs can be identified to activities through the appropriation
accounting sy3t,eta because each activity has a separate allotment.
O^her Procurement, flaw
Ihis account is received primarily for " capital-type" purchases
but some operating oost items are procured with these funds because
they have long procurement lead times. Examples of such items are
ammunition, specialized spare parts and major equipment components.
Iftey are operating costs in the sense that they are used to maintain
weapons in a state of readiness. The consumption of these resources
is controlled in the same manner as other bureau managed items. As
in the other ^ase, organizational units are not identified at the
time of purchase.
Summary
The Navy Accounting System is really two separate accounting




costs when they are obligated irrespective of when they are actually
consumed. It identifies the consuming activity only when the funds
have been alloted to them for administration. A large portion of the
Navy's total opera ting costs are managed directly by bureaus, ihese
costs are not identified to organizational units at the time of
purchase.
The cost accounting system is designed to meet the needs of
management for purposes other than fiscal control. It collects costs
by organizational unit when the resources are consumed regardless of
the time of purchase. Bureau managed resources arc costed to
organizational units by means of statistical source documents inserted
into the cost accounting system at the time of resource consumption.
These two accounting systems are never in complete agreement
because they account for resources at different times. The
appropriation system accounts for resources when they are purchased




WAVY COST INFORMATION SYSTEM
Introduction
The Navy Cost Information System is a financial management
system designed to relate manpower, material, equipment and their
respective costs to major missions and weapon-system for management
decision-making.*
This system was developed to "bridge the gap" between the
Department of Defense programming system and the Navy budget structure
and its related accounting system. Thus, it was designed to be an
integrated financial information system interrelating planning,
programming, budgeting and appraisal which would provide management
with the necessary information for decision-making. Primary
2
objectives of the system were:
a. Portray Naval and Marine Corps forces and their associated
cost by Department of Defense program element and appropriation
structure.
b. Provide data for program and financial analysis.
c. Relate program decisions to the budget structure.
d. Provide cost values that are common to both programming and
department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Navy Cost






budgeting in order to allow direct translation from one to the other,
p. provide data for cost-ef fretdveoess studies.
f. Identify the cost of a specified force.
The most difficult task of the Navy Cost Information System i;s
to translate Force Structure and Financial Program data to and from
the appropriation account and budget structure. This translation
is essential if program plans are to be Integrated in the annual
administrative budget.
Unit Identifiers
Automatic data processors can take the drudgery out of any
translation problem as long as the input and output data have common
identifiable cost units. The term "unit identifier" Is used to denote
common units for which costs can be collected and identified in both
the programming and appropriation syste .
Die Five Year Force Structure groups organizational units
performing similar major missions into program elements. A single
fleet unit, such as a ship or a squadron of aircraft is assigned to only
one program element. herefore, a single fleet unit represents the
highest echelon in the Navy organization srhich is commonly identifiable
in both dimensions. However, the total operating costs of these units
are not readily identified by the Navy Accounting System. Only a
part of an organization's operating costs can be directly identified
in the appropriation dimension. The cost of resources furnished by
the bureaus cannot be directly identified to the using organization.
Specifically, the Mavy Accounting System identifies the organization
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which is accountable for the obligation—not the organization
which consumes the resources purchased by the obligation. As a
result, costs charged to organizational units only reflect those
for which &hey hold accountable allotments, Ihus, actual operating
costs of program elements cannot be directly identified by the Navy
Cost Information System because a common entity for costing does not
exist between the two systems which it attempts to n bridge 11 •
r
,ven though direct translation is not possible for individual
organizational units, the bureaus have accounts in the appropriation
accounting system which identify the cost of various resources in
categories which can be closely associated with program elements.
For example, an account might collect all the fuel cost for a specific
"class" or type of ship. Another account might collect all the costs
for overhauling a particular type of aircraft. Ihese accounts are
useful for associating operating costs because in most cases all
aircraft of a single type or all ships of a single class are assigned
to a single program element. When this is the case, all the costs
collected against one of these accounts can be assigned directly to
the program element.
Other accounts collect costs for resources which are not all
consumed by a single element but which can be identified to groups of
elements. In these oases the costs in the account can be allocated or
prorated to the several elements on the basis of the number of consuming
units assigned. For example, personnel costs can be prorated to
elements on the basis of the number of personnel assigned in the Force
Structure. An average annual cost of officers and enlisted men is used
to facilitate this type of allocation. Since every military person
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is assigned to only one program element, total allocation of all
military personnel costs can be distributed &aong the program elements.
{here are many categories of operating costs which cannot be
prorated to program elements on any rational basis. Some of these
costs can be identified to a major program and others cannot be identi-
fied to any specific program. These costs are assigned to separate
program elements within the major program which they serve. In all
cases where these functions cannot be associated with a major program,
they are assigned to functional program elements in major program
number VII. Program VII, General Support, is commonly referred to as
the "catch all" program because all unallocated costs are accounted
for in this program. Fxamples of these might be Navy Wide Commun-
ications, Navy Intelligence, Individual Training, Family Housing,
Medical Services, Servicewid© Supply, Departmental Txpen3es and Navy
Industrial Fund Fixpenses. These are not necessarily overhead costs.
Rather, they are costs which cannot be allocated to programs or
elements on a reasonable basis.
It is quite apparent that operating costs which have to be pro-
rated are at best "first approximations" of the true operating costs
obligated for program elements. They represent average figures which
do not reflect the intensity of activity of the organizational units
assigned to different elements. Further, they do not represent trends
in costs which might be due to differences in material condition or
operating efficiences of "he different elements.
The inadequacy of these cost estimates is shown by a problem
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which occured in 1964. the Secretary sailed for an addendum budget
to incorporate all ou ^steading program change proposals even though
they had not yet been approved, Cost estimates for change proposals
are maie in the same maimer as estimates for program elements, that
is, on the basis of average costs allocated to specific programs.
Consequently, the addendum budget, based on program change estimates,
did not represent realistic financial requirements. In this case,
feudgejfr decisions were going to be made in terms of the specific
program change proposals. Adjustments were required as follows:
'flie ft 1964 Addendum Budget was submitted to the Secretary
of Defense on October 1, 1962. Shortly thereafter, an amend-
ment was submitted which revised the costing of the military
personnel from that used in the program change proposals to
that required for adjusting the Basic Budget which was costed
in the traditional manner. Hence, the year-end numbers were
converted to average numbers and the per capita rates were
replaced by actual or average rat^s for specific items of
entitlement (basic pay, etc. ) for officers and enlisted by
grade. It was necessary to recost each program change proposal
separately so that, upon approval by the Secretary of Defense,
the effect of each on the Basic Bud fret could be determined. 3
ho above example clearly Illustrates the inadequacy of the cost
estimates in the Financial Program, iftey are "representative" of
operating costs but not sufficiently representative to be used as a
base for budgeting.
^Departement of the Mavy, Office of the Comptroller, Budget Digest.







Navy financial management is faced with a three dimensional
problem. The Secretary of Defense makes financial decisions in terras
of programs and program elements. Congress makes decisions in terms
of appropriations and their subheads. Finally, these decisions are
executed through a formal organization which embraces an entangled
financial interrelationship among operating forces, bureaus and
offices. The word entangled is used because financial responsibility
generally does not follow the organizational chain of command. Each
face of this three-sided problem represents a detailed and somewhat
independent financial management sub-system.
The Secretary of Defense makes major decisions with the
assistance of the Department of Defense Programming system in which
each military force and function in the Department is grouped into
one of several hundred mission elements. £ach element represents a
specific type of defense output. Navy forces and functions are
grouped into approximately three hundred fifty different program
elements, flie grouping of organizational units into these program
elements is almost completely dissimilar to their grouping in the
formal Navy organization.




a year when they approve the administrative budget. This budget is
presented to Congress in terras of programs by the Secretary of Defense
but it is reviewed and approved in terms of appropriations and subheads.
These subheads represent approved funds for specific "purposes" or
functions. Here again, the subdivisions of the appropriations do not
completely coincide with the formal organization of the Navy. However,
they do follow the bureau level of financial responsibility.
Congressional financial decisions prevail; therefore, budgets
approved by Congress must be translated into Department of Defense
program decisions. The Navy Cost Information System is designed to
translate budget decisions from budget language to program element
language. Thus, it is the system through which financial decisions
are transmitted to the tfavy for execution and through which program
progress data should flow back to the .Secretary of Defense. If the
Department of Defense Programming system influences operating costs
of program elements, this influence must be exerted through the Navy
Cost Information System because the Navy executes its programs in
budget language.
The Bmjr executes financial plans through two broad financial
management systems. One system is used for fiscal control and the
other for management of resources. The latter system consists of
many sub-systems each designed to manage specific resources or
functions. These sub-systems represent the foundation of Navy
operating management. They are the most widely used at both field
and bureau level because they measure the performance of management




ihe fiscal control syste- is the vehicle through which funds
are alloted and controlled. It compliments the v? rious rr.ane etnent
systems but fiscal reporting does not measure operating performance.
Ooxisequently, the annual administrative operating budget, which in
total limits the operating fund allocations through the fiscal control
system, is more often used as a vehicle for obtaining funds than as
a detailed financial plan. The apparent "misuse" of the budget has
drawn a great deal of criticism from scholars and businessmen; however,'
it must be remembered that the budget is formulated many months before
it is executed, 'ftie management systems, on the other hand, are
current in comparison and provide the timely response required to
effectively manage resources on a day-to-day basis. These systems
identify problems which arise long after the budget is formulated. So
doubt closer adherence to the annual operating budget would draw more
criticism than relegating it to its present status an an "upper limit"
financial plan.
The itfavy management systems and the appropriation system for
fincal control are complimentary in the manner in which they are used.
Obligation authority is authorized in terms of budget projects which
limit bureau programs. Within these limitations, bureaus manage their
programs and allocate funds to field organizations in a manner which
best serves current needs. Organizational operating budgets must in
turn be developed on the basis of the amounts of operating funds
authorized by the bureaus, therefore, field organizations do not
always view allotments of funds as budgets. Rather, they are viewed
as monetary limitations into which operating budgets must be "squeezed".
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In those cases where the funds are not ailoted to field activities
or fleet units, management of resources is often performed in units
other than dollars, r'or example, personnel ary managed in terns of
numbers rather than dollars. Consequently, the exact interrelation
which exists between the Navy management systems operating plans
and the fiscal control system financial plan is difficult to establish
except in terms of broad., total dollar "envelopes".
The Department of Defense programming system, among other
things, envisions a direct link between program decisions and
operating budgets. A program decision *hich reduces the activity of
a program should be reflected in the operating budgets of the units
associated with that program, 'the fulfillment of this requires a
direct financial link between the program structure and the operating
budget structure of the units and activities associated with the
program elements. The Navy Cost Information System is used to
establish this link but the link Is weak in several respects. Ihese




Government budgeting is a process by which the use of resources
is planned and controlled, - Resources are used to acquire new
facilities and to operate those facilities already in use. As a
result, a major financial planning decision in the budget process is
the choice between these two possible end-uses of resources, that is,
the choice between capital expenditures and operations. This decision
roust be integrated with prograra decisions—decisions which express
policy objectives of the resource allocations. The necessity of this
integration in military budgeting is especially important because
prograra objectives, expressed in terms of military outputs, are often
in fact only expressed in dollar terms. That is, military output is
often a direct function of resources allocated for operations.
Capital acquisitions of weapon-systems do not in themselves
achieve military output objectives. These objectives are achieved only
through operations of the weapon- systems. A weapon-syste«a has little,
if any, military value until it is operational and until it has been
allocated operating resources which permit it to "produce" military
benefit, iherefore, program decisions made by the Secretary of Defense,
which allocate present and future resources to operations, are potential-






chooses the "best" weapon-system because the operating resource
allocation, in fact, limits the potential military output of the
weapon- :;vstem.
In the Department of Defense programming process, the above
two decisions are made concurrently. Lifetime operating costs are
approved ts a part of the decision-malcing process. thus, the potential
military output of the weapon-system is determined In two respects.
First, the amount of resources approved for procuring the weapon-
system determine the siae; and second, the amount of resources
allocated for operations determine the military benefit which can be
derived from the weapon-system because operating cost allocations, in
f ; s ence, establish "quantified" military output objectives.
When the Navy accepts a program decision made on the basis of
a cost-effectiveness analysis which stipulates future operating costs,
a tacit "agreement" is made with the Secretary of Defense which implies
that a given military output(effectiveaess) can be achieved with -he
operating funds and physical resources "pre-allocated" in the five
l&ar Force Structure and Financial Plan, liowever, this agreement is
not firm until budget time shea the Secretary of Defense in effect
establishes "new" outp>ut objectives by approving operating requests
in the Uavy's proposed budget. hese new objec ives apply to the
output of the ?<avy, not to the output of separac* program elements.
Ihat is, they are applicable to the Navy as a whole, an entity not
singularly identifiable in program terms. Consequently, program
element objectives, stated in terms of program element operating costs,
are merged into Javy objectives, stated in terms of appropriations and
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budget- projects. From this point in the buu et cycle, Navy operating
funds are managed in terms which are completely independent from
program elements.
ioretically, the sum of all Kavy prograi element objectives
should equal the Navy objective, that i3, the whole should equal the
sua of its parts. To the extent that the sum does equal the whole,
the Department of Defense programming system if. integrated with the
financial management of Kavy operating fund 3, Is the purpose of
the programming process the allocation of operating funds to the
entity Navy? the stated purpose of this process is to manage military
outputs in terms other than service entities. This being the case,
how can these military outputs be managed if their identity is lost
during program (budget) execution? How can these military outputs be
managed if the cost of their operations cannot be reported on a
periodic and reasonably accurate basis? If program element decisions
are to be meaningful, operating budgets of organizational units
assigned to specific program elements must reflect program element
decisions end vice versa, operating decisions made in terms of specific
weapon-systems should be reflected accurately in terms of program
elenent costs.
The Navy Zost Information System attempts to translate financial
data between the program element dimension and the budget dimension.
Information gathered for this study reveals that this translation only
"associates" costs between the two dimensions. Direct translation of
operating co3tr is not possible because common accounting and costing
entities do not exist in both dimensions which permit data to be
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identified sad interchanged. The accounting entities in the budget
ension are budget projects. rh&'~& are "f ::ictionc.l n or ''bure
projest" accounts which represent segments of Navy operating costs,
he accounting entities in the programming system are program elements.
Program elements generally represent groupings of organizational units
but exceptions to this exist in the case of program elements in major
program VII, General Support. The* e ; "ogram elements represent
"functional" groupings such as medical care and se.~vice-vri.de supply
operations. Consequently, organizational operating costs are not all
included in the cost of the program element to which the organization
is assigned. That is, some functional costs must be deducted from
an organization's operating cost and placed in other program elements.
This proliferation of operating costs between program elements
evidently reflects an attempt to align program elements with budget
projects found in the administrative budget. In so doing, a large
amount of operating cost has been "lodged" in program elements which
have no assigned military output. In fiscal year 1965, 3*06 billion
dollars or twenty percent of the entire U'avy budget was allocated
1
to major program VII—the program without military missions.
he purpose of this study is to examine the differences which
exist among the three views of Havy operating costs, >:hat is, the view
expressed in budget terms, the view expressed in program terms, and
the view expressed in organizational terms. These differences prohibit
integration of financial information in the Navy.
' '"* ' w.^^.m-m*mmm—*mmam n i n I I m i i i i n. i i n i i i i m ,. i , i n ,
o
Budget Digest, l-'is^al Year 1965, oi>» Jit ., p. Jo.
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The first, an 1 perhaps the most it oortan f, difference, is I
ine* in which operating costs ar t is, the ©bating
entities. The administrative budge* groups costs in terms of resource
inputs such bs personnel, fuel, facility main beamice and utilities,
these budget projects are decision and accounting entities during the
entire budgeting process. The Department of Defense groups costs
in different terms—program elements. These revrresent decision-making
and accounting entities during the entire planning and programming
process. Last, the Navy manages operating resources in terms of
organizational entities. Organizational units are decision-making
entities for operations but not always accounting entities for tlie
management of resources. The organizational units convert resource
inputs into military outputs. This conversion is managed and partially
evaluated by means of many different management mb-? .-steins, The net
result of all the pertinent management sub- systems applicable to a
given organizational unit might be thought of as an organizational
"operating budget" expressed in both financial and nou-financial
terms. That is, a portion of each organization's operating budget
is managed by means of different management system. The sanageinent
systems viewed as a "whole", represents the control over organizational
operating costs.
Organizational operating budgets are seen by this author as
the connecting link between the administrative budget and the program
control system. The operating budgets represent the consummation of
program objectives and budget objectives—the melding of budget dollars








blocks for both the budget and the programming process. Unfortunately
however, the organizational unit is not an accounting entity in the
Navy's accounting system. With the exception of Indus trial/coratnercial
type activities and a few bureau shore activities which have developed
complete performance-type budgets, total operating costs of Navy
organisational entities cannot be readily obtained from accounting
records and reports. Total operating costs for organizational entities
can be obtained only by collecting "bits and pieces** of costs from all
the management systems which are associated with that activity. Fven
if these costs could be accumulated, they would not satisfy present
programming requirements because they do not have a common basis for
measuring operating costs. Operating costs in the programming system
are measured in terms of totajl obligaticnal authority. Operating
costs gathered from the different Navy management systems would
represent a combination of measures. Some would be measured in terms
of obligations and others in terms of actual resources consumed or
expired operating costs.
The three dimensions of financial management examined in this
thesis do not represent an integrated financial management system.
"Real" integration exists only in that they each operate within the
same financial envelopes approved by the Congress. Attempts to
integrate these three dimensions in their present form will be
unsuccessful until an integrated accounting system is developed which
will permit the same financial data to be reviewed and reported in the
three dimensions without the use of translation "crutches" such as




.r. integrated accounting system, properly designed, could aerve
the needs of all leve"1 s of management. It could replace many of the
reports and "sub-system" management accounting requirements presently
needed to manage "slivers" of operating costs. Military organizational
units could be designated as "common" planning and control entities
in the three dimensions. Operating budgets for these units could be
the financial "building blocks" on which both administrative budgeting
and programming could be built. These organisational units could be
the basis for collecting and reporting operating costs in an accrual
accounting system where costs represent expenses or resources consumed.
Fiscal control for budgetary purposes could be incorporated into
organizational operating budgets by limiting expense categories or
by issuance of expense allotment authorizations.
In conclusion, an integrated financial management system would
require resolving basic differences which exist among the three
dimensions of financial management but these differences are not
insurmountable, iheir elimination would not necessarily require a
reorganization of the Navy but their resolution v?ould require a major
change in Mavy accounting philosophy and a change in the program
element structure. The new accounting philosophy would have to
reflect organizational accounting entities which represent military
outputs as well as budget projects which represent resource inputs.
It would have to reflect decentralized financial responsibility over
operating costs, that is, expenses would have to be controlled through
operating expense budgets rather than through bureau controlled
resource management systems. This would not necessarily remove bureau
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"pre-control" over operating costs because the expanse budgets
?yould still require approval*
A shift of financial responsibility to organizational units
might have many beneficial effects for management. It might allow
organizational units to participate more in long range planning,
thus reducing the tendency to look at budgets a3 "one year goals' 1 .
It might encourage organizational commanders to better evaluate
their operations and to suggest or ado^-t better methods for performing
their missions. And last, it might motivate better financial
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